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Abstract 
 
Gray is the New Black: Great Power Competition in the Gray Zone 
 
Cole Adam Spitzack, MPAff 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisor:  Jeremi Suri 
 
 The 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy herald 
the return of great power competition as the focus of U.S. national security after an 
almost three-decade hiatus. While the United States was enraptured with the “Unipolar 
Moment” and consumed with fighting terrorism, the character of great power conflict 
was changing. Leveraging disruptive information technologies and potent amalgamations 
of national power in a dynamic hyper-globalized environment, great power competitors 
are exposing U.S. vulnerabilities in the ambiguity of the Gray Zone between war and 
peace. U.S. adversaries like China and Russia are increasingly operating outside of 
traditional conflict models, exploiting our struggle to clearly conceptualize and counter 
Gray Zone methods. Examining recent literature and utilizing profiles of China and 
Russia, this work argues that the Gray Zone is an urgently relevant concept for framing 
the unique character of great power conflict in the present age. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In November 2016, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published their assessment of the near-future 
as a chaotic, contested, and complex environment of pervasive disorder.1  Against this dire future 
the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) highlights the rise of competition across the political, 
economic, and military domains, with particular focus on great power rivalries with Russia and 
China.2  The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) warns that the United States has suffered from 
“strategic atrophy” and faces an increasingly anarchic global environment marked by a receding 
liberal, rules-based international order under attack by revisionist states.3  In a major departure 
from U.S. policy since September 11, 2001, the 2018 NDS unequivocally states that “inter-state 
strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern of U.S. national security.”4  One 
of the central trends in this dynamic environment of rising challenges to U.S. dominance and 
international norms is the increasing exploitation of the ambiguous realm between war and peace, 
characterized as the “Gray Zone.”   
The Gray Zone is an important new construct for understanding the contemporary strategic 
landscape and the methods being employed by our principal competitors. Although many of the 
techniques being employed in the Gray Zone are not inherently new, many of the tools are, and 
their deliberate application in a concerted manner to challenge U.S. national interests and exploit 
seams in the U.S. strategic paradigm are cause for serious concern and consideration. China and 
Russia have honed their strategic approaches to counter U.S. dominance through decades of 
observing the United States operate in conflicts around the world. Both have deliberately 
developed non-kinetic means and strategies to determine outcomes that negate U.S. advantages in 
conventional conflicts. In the last decade, these Gray Zone strategies have yielded startling changes 
to the world map. Russia has nominally acquired Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and the 
                                               
1 “Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
last modified on November 28, 2016, https://publicintelligence.net/jcs-joe-2035/.  
2 Donald Trump, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 2. 
3 Ibid, 1. 
4 Ibid. 
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Donbas, while China has exerted de facto control of large swathes of the South China Sea, its 
associated reefs and islands, and accompanying natural resources. A less discussed but greater 
danger is the erosion of U.S. credibility and the subversion of the liberal international order. It is 
crucial to understand the evolving Gray Zone strategies being employed by our adversaries and 
develop appropriate counter-measures to prevent the continued debilitation of U.S. national 
interests, power, and security. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Is the Gray Zone useful for understanding present forms of great power competition? 
2. As great power competitors, how are China and Russia operating in the Gray Zone? 
ORGANIZATION 
This paper will address great power competition in the context of the Gray Zone. The 
purpose is to demonstrate that the Gray Zone is a valid and useful construct for understanding the 
unique paradigm in great power conflict that now exists due to the advent of disruptive 
technologies and the distinctive strategic environment that now prevails. I start with defining the 
Gray Zone and addressing concerns over its merit. I then support its relevance as a functional 
concept, making the case that contemporary great power conflict is best understood through the 
conceptual frame of the Gray Zone. To support this argument, I choose to profile the two great 
power adversaries identified in the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy, China and Russia. I 
explore several commonalities that both great power possesses before delving into each 
individually. I build upon the most recent literature to offer a contemporary profile of Russian and 
Chinese capabilities and strategies in the Gray Zone. To provide contrast I organize each profile 
into subsections according to the classic DIME-model for national elements of power: diplomatic, 
information, military, and economic. I conclude with general recommendations of what must be 
done and why, and a warning about the costs of ignoring the Gray Zone. 
  3 
THE GRAY ZONE DEFINED 
Although it was first conceptualized in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, General 
Joseph Votel, current commander of CENTCOM and former SOCOM commander, formally 
introduced the term “Gray Zone” on March 18, 2015 in a statement to the House Armed Services 
Committee’s Subcommittee on Emerging Threats.5  A white paper prepared by Navy Captain 
Philip Kapusta at SOCOM later in 2015 formally defined Gray Zone challenges as:  
Competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between 
the traditional war and peace duality… characterized by ambiguity about the nature of 
conflict, opacity of the parties involved or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal 
frameworks.6 
A burgeoning literature on the Gray Zone has since added to this original definition, although 
Kapusta’s definition still remains the most cited and accepted. Michael Mazarr, a senior political 
scientist for RAND and author of a comprehensive report on the Gray Zone for the Strategic 
Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, offers a four-point definition that further 
elucidates characteristics of Gray Zone conflicts: (1) cohesive, integrated campaigns; (2) 
employing unconventional tools; (3) that deliberately avoids escalation to outright conventional 
conflict; and (4) is strategically gradual in nature.7  Mazarr also categorically defines the revisionist 
intent of contemporary powers employing Gray Zone strategies to modify the international order 
to serve their own interests.8     
Combining the definitions of Kapusta and Mazarr offers a comprehensive composite that 
more clearly delineates what constitutes conflict in the Gray Zone:  
- Aggressive, coercive competition among or within state or non-state actors 
- Ambiguity about the nature of the conflict 
                                               
5 “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016: Special Operations Forces in Uncertain Threat 
Environment,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, House Armed Services 
Committee, House of Representatives, 114th Congress, 18 March 2015, 
https://fas.org/irp/congress/2015_hr/031815votel.pdf. 
6 Philip Kapusta, “The Gray Zone,” White Paper prepared for United States Special Operations Command, 9 
September 2015, https://info.publicintelligence.net/USSOCOM-GrayZones.pdf  
7 Michael Mazarr, “Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict,” Strategic Studies 
Institute, December 2015, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1303.pdf, 57. 
8 Ibid, 4. 
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- Opacity of the parties involved 
- Uncertainty about the legal frameworks  
- Cohesive, integrated campaigns across multiple domains 
- The use of mostly non-kinetic, unconventional tools 
- Deliberately avoids escalation to outright conventional conflict or interstate war 
- Strategically gradual  
In addition to defining Gray Zone characteristics, there is need to address the larger 
constitution of the nebulous concept. Scholars differ on the degree that the Gray Zone constitutes 
a type of strategy, conflict, or set of conditions.9  While all three characterizations offer some 
utility, the Gray Zone is principally a qualifier for certain forms of conflict between war and peace, 
as defined above. As the term directly implies, it is a “zone” on the broad spectrum of conflict that 
blends war and peace in shades of “gray” that are neither fully war nor fully peace. In this way, 
the Gray Zone is a classification of conflict, but also to a lesser extent, the set of conditions that 
define the environment in which that conflict exists. As a description of strategy, the Gray Zone is 
useful for depicting the intentional exploitation of this form of conflict to accomplish objectives 
without provoking war. Just as a strategy of attrition or containment broadly describes the ways to 
achieve a strategic end, so our adversaries can broadly be characterized as employing Gray Zone 
strategies to achieve their respective revisionist goals.  
THE GRAY ZONE DEBATE  
With any new term or conceptual framework there is invariably resistance, and it is 
important to acknowledge that the Gray Zone concept is not without detractors. As an emergent 
theory to describe contemporary activities by revisionist actors the Gray Zone is criticized as being 
an ill-defined and incoherent concept that deranges strategic understanding. Critics like Adam 
Elkus claim that the Gray Zone supplants established terms of art such as compelleence, 
subversion, and irregular warfare, ignoring the extensive research and knowledge amassed on such 
                                               
9 Sean Coffman, Rob Shumaker, and Jeff Givens, “Perception is Reality: Special Operations Forces in the Gray 
Zone,” (Master Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1026159.pdf, 8. 
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long-standing concepts in favor of the development of “new and exotic terminology” of dubious 
utility.10  Others, like Ben Lowsen, contend that the Gray Zone concept is counterproductive, 
providing margin for China in the South China Sea and Russian actions in Ukraine that otherwise 
represent black-and-white cases of unlawful state aggression and violations of national 
sovereignty.11   
Another common critique is that the Gray Zone has become a catch-all concept, too 
unwieldly to have any real meaning. Indeed, some have haphazardly applied the term Gray Zone 
to Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Islamic State, and the civil wars in Yemen and Syria.12  Such 
instances do not fall within the prominently accepted definitional framework for the Gray Zone 
and were therefore cited in error. Terrorism, insurgencies, and civil wars, which encompass the 
examples above, are distinctly established forms of conflict that the Gray Zone does not subsume 
or supplant. The Gray Zone does, however, span a significant portion of the spectrum of conflict 
short of war serving as an umbrella term under which many established conventions of conflict 
reside. The Gray Zone includes a dizzying array of sub-categorizations of conflict, the list of 
“warfares” alone is extensive—Irregular Warfare, Political Warfare, Information Warfare, Hybrid 
Warfare, etc., but the scope of the Gray Zone should not be cause for undervaluing its place in the 
strategic lexicon.  
In response to these criticisms, distinguished professor Hal Brands argues that the Gray 
Zone concept, properly defined, is falsifiable, distinct, and holds merit as a construct for greater 
understanding of the contemporary strategic environment and the forms of conflict being waged 
in it.13  Akin to terms of art such as Gun-Boat Diplomacy or Cold War, which were developed to 
                                               
10 Adam Elkus, “50 Shades of Gray: Why the Gray War Concept Lacks Strategic Sense,” War on the Rocks, 
December 15, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/50-shades-of-gray-why-the-gray-wars-concept-lacks-
strategic-sense/  
11 Ben Lowsen, “China’s Maritime Operation: The ‘Gray Zone’ in Black and White,” The Diplomat, May 18, 2017, 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/chinas-maritime-operation-the-gray-zone-in-black-and-white/ 
12 David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Fighting and Winning in the ‘Gray Zone’,” War on the Rocks, May 19, 2015, 
https://warontherocks.com/2015/05/fighting-and-winning-in-the-gray-zone/  
13 Hals Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 5, 2016, 
https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/  
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constructively conceptualize conflict in the context of their time, so the Gray Zone represents a 
useful convention for encapsulating the evolving character of conflict within the context of the 
present age. Searching the etymology of terms characterizing conflict, most emerge following a 
significant epochal transition in technology, strategic environment, or both. The failure of existing 
terms to adequately convey the subsequent change in the character of conflict and the desire for 
theorists and practitioners to demarcate the new paradigm from the old gives rise to new 
terminology. The Gray Zone term and its corresponding construct addresses the need to 
conceptualize the new character of conflict prevailing today. 
Words Matter 
The advent of nuclear weapons and the ideologically-infused, bi-polar world order that 
arose from World War II marked a historical inflection point that demanded a new conceptual 
framework for understanding. Accompanying the new thinking, a new term emerged – Cold War 
– that aptly subsumed the unique strategic reality of the time. Popularized by Pulitzer Prize winning 
writer Walter Lippmann, who published a book by the same name in 1947, the term Cold War 
captured the nature of the strategic conflict between the United States, the Soviet Union, and their 
respective allies between 1946-1989 without confusing strategic theory or undermining political 
science. Timeless concepts of coercion, subversion, compellence, etc. all remained valid elements 
of the conflict within the broader construct of the Cold War framework, but the term itself helped 
define the overall arc of the conflict.  
The annals of strategic literature venerate understanding the character of conflict and one’s 
adversary as paramount. Sun Tzu famously contends that “If you know the enemy and know 
yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles,” and that success “is gained by carefully 
accommodating ourselves to the enemy’s purpose.”14  Machiavelli warns against seeing things as 
one wishes them to be rather than how they truly are.15  Clausewitz talks of the chameleon nature 
of conflict and contends that understanding the context and character of the conflict is foremost 
                                               
14 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles, 29, Kindle. 
15 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, 8, Kindle. 
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for the strategist.16  The obvious danger is either misunderstanding the character of the conflict or 
wishing it to be something it is not. The same is true regarding one’s adversaries. History is replete 
with examples of such misunderstandings ending poorly.  
Strategic understanding starts with a fundamental frame of reference often defined in an 
overarching term or phrase that helps cage the mind to properly consider the matter being framed. 
Different words trigger unique cerebral responses and emotions while serving to prime the mind 
to process information according to the experiential and cognitive associations of particular 
words.17  Competition, containment, détente, appeasement, and others elicit disparate frames based 
on their etymological basis, historical precedent, socio-cultural filters, and individual association. 
The introduction of a term such as Cold War does not assume to explain the infinite complexities 
of conflict between the United States and Soviet Union, but as a term of art it provided a 
fundamental means to frame understanding of the conflict. The use of the word “War” suggested 
that it was the ultimate form of conflict while the use of the preface “Cold” paradoxically implies 
that it was not a shooting war, although there was indeed plenty of that. The central feature of the 
Cold War was the constraints imposed by fear of escalation to Nuclear Armageddon, and in that 
regard the term was effective as the conceptual frame for understanding the defining character of 
the conflict. Had the term “Hot War” been adopted in the late 1940s the world might be a very 
different place today.  
Just as the Cold War conceptualized superpower competition in the late-20th century, the 
Gray Zone conceptualizes the unique character of conflict as we find it today. While the Nuclear 
Age forever changed the destructive capacity of war, the innovation and proliferation of 
information technologies has created an entirely new domain – cyberspace – which effects 
virtually all facets of modern human interaction and marks another historical inflection point. 
Under the pervasive shadow of nuclear war, the intersection of the Information Revolution and 
                                               
16 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J.J. Graham, Book 1, Chapter 1, Kindle. 
17 Margie Meacham, “How Words Affect our Brains,” Association for Talent Development, July 11, 2013, 
https://www.td.org/insights/how-words-affect-our-brains  
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rising great power challengers seeking to end U.S. global dominance has yielded a new form of 
conflict. David Patrikarakos goes so far as to argue that new information technologies make 
winning the “narrative” and “discursive” levels of conflict more important than battlefield 
successes.18  This environment and these new innovations also enable a new degree of anonymity 
and ambiguity which revisionist actors are maximizing to great effect. Together, these fundamental 
changes in the technology and state of human affairs, coupled with the changing strategic 
environment, demand a new frame of reference for understanding the character of conflict. 
A New Name for a New Form of Conflict 
As its name implies, ambiguity is the defining feature of Gray Zone conflict, and the United 
States is ill-natured for this new form of conflict. As Americans, the rule of law is predominant in 
our cultural consciousness and we tend to see war and peace in discrete legal terms—black or 
white—while the idea of the Gray Zone engenders a shadowy third space outside the normative 
and legal confines of the international order. In fact, a common criticism of the Gray Zone is its 
penchant for muddling what is otherwise clearly established by historical precedent and legal 
frameworks.19  But the world is neither binary nor discrete. As defense analyst Nadia Schadlow 
describes it, “the space between peace and war is not an empty one - but a landscape churning with 
political, economic, and security competitions that require constant attention.”20  In this 
understanding, competition in the international arena exists on a continuous spectrum of conflict 
with infinite derivatives of war and peace mixing and morphing in dynamic interplay. National 
security expert Frank Hoffman contends that many of the actors excelling in the Gray Zone possess 
                                               
18 David Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters: How Social Media is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First 
Century, (New York: Basic Books, 2017). 
19 Adam Elkus, “50 Shades of Gray: Why the Gray War Concept Lacks Strategic Sense,” War on the Rocks, 
December 15, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/50-shades-of-gray-why-the-gray-wars-concept-lacks-
strategic-sense/  
20 Nadia Schadlow, “Peace and War: The Space Between,” War on the Rocks, August 18, 
2014,  https://warontherocks.com/2014/08/peace-and-war-the-space-between/  
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strategic cultures that “envision a more complex continuum of cooperation, competition, 
collaboration, and conflict.”21 Such a continuum is largely anathema to U.S. strategic thinking.  
Not only does the United States struggle with conceptualizing such a continuum of 
interaction, we also tend to think in terms of definitive outcomes and finite periods. The curse of 
the American way of war, our history, and our long-standing dominance is an unmitigated 
expectation of conclusive victory. Our strategic culture favors decisive end-states, quantifiable 
outcomes, and the conceptualization of conflict as something that we can systematically 
deconstruct into a series of compartmentalized components or delineated phases.22  A prime 
example is the U.S. military’s six-phase operational planning framework. Asked how the Gray 
Zone fit in this 6-phase framework, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford 
responded, “I don’t find the current phasing construct for operational plans particularly useful right 
now.”23  In other words, actions by our adversaries in the Gray Zone confound our neat, linear 
models for how we wish to prosecute conflict. Our adversaries are not playing by our rules, nor 
should we expect them to. Dominance has a shelf-life driven by how quickly competitors find 
weaknesses to exploit for asymmetric advantage. The Gray Zone naturally exposes our 
vulnerabilities, affording an inherent advantage to autocratic, illiberal regimes over liberal, 
democratic states constrained by transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. 
Historically, Americans are uncomfortable with hazy spectrums of amorphous conflict or 
complex problems that are not easily disentangled, and the results of our involvement in such 
conflicts has been repugnance and a desire to never engage in such conflict again. The U.S. 
experience in the Vietnam War still pervades the American psyche, and indications are not good 
for how the existing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan will mar U.S. strategic culture. In contrast, 
                                               
21 Frank Hoffman, “The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid 
Modes of War,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed January 21, 2018, 
http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/essays/contemporary-spectrum-of-conflict/#fn46-1381 
22 Paul Scharre, “American Strategy and the Six Phases of Grief,” War on the Rocks, October 6, 2016, 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/american-strategy-and-the-six-phases-of-grief/  
23 Jim Garamone. “Dunford Discusses Challenges to the Joint Force, Need for Defense Reform.” March 29, 2016. 
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/707639/dunford-discusses-challenges-to-the-joint-force-need-for-
defense-reform/  
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the American polity venerates the Desert Storm model because it was cheap, easy, and limited, 
and it remains the gold standard for the U.S. military – ordered, decisive, and conventional – the 
perfect war. But recent history and those divining the near-future find that the emerging character 
of conflict is messy, ill-defined, and unsatisfying in outcome.24  If the United States is to succeed 
in such an environment we must adapt our expectations and our understanding of the character of 
conflict. Conceptually embracing the Gray Zone is a start. 
 
  
                                               
24 Hoffman, “The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict.”  
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Chapter 2: The Future is Gray 
In one of the tragic ironies of history, then-President George H.W. Bush proclaimed a new 
world order on September 11, 1990 to a joint session of Congress, exactly eleven years before the 
worst terrorist attack in history abruptly changed the world again.25  Nearly two decades after the 
attacks of 9/11, the world appears new yet again, although without the catalyst of a falling wall or 
collapsing towers. The quickening advance of the Information Revolution and emerging realities 
of Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics, and big data are rapidly forging a new age in human 
history. The speed of human progress has never been so compelling or disruptive. The proliferation 
of the Internet is making access to information ubiquitous while enabling rapid, unprecedented 
galvanization of social movements that are fundamentally changing human interaction and the 
nature of power. The world is increasingly interconnected and interdependent with growing 
networks of people that transcend classic nation-state boundaries and identities. In conjunction 
with this paradigm shift in information access and diffusion, what constitutes truth is increasingly 
fungible with many heralding the era of post-truth, creating fertile ground for malign influence and 
manipulation by insidious actors. 
In this increasingly digitized, networked world the ability to generate and wield power is 
no longer the sole prerogative of states. The Arab Spring, the rise of the Islamic State, and the 
emergence of populist movements demonstrate that non-state networks can challenge the 
international order. Former Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, recently wrote about how the power of connections and networks is gradually 
subsuming classic notions of power rooted in tangible capabilities as the Information Age 
supplants the Industrial Age, and the power of participation by the masses increasingly rivals the 
power of ownership by elites.26  The rise of collectives networked by identity rather than geography 
is increasingly challenging the primacy of the nation-state in global politics.  
                                               
25 Cohen, The Big Stick, 248. 
26 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Chessboard and the Web, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). 
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Just as instruments of agency in the international order have diversified, so has the nature 
of the domain. Unlike the Cold War era, there is no overarching strategic rivalry that defines the 
global environment and orders the international system. George Kennan famously embodied U.S. 
strategy for over 40 years with the term “containment,” but today’s rapidly changing global 
environment thwarts simplification. In what some have called the era of fragmentation, agency is 
increasingly dispersed amongst a growing number of actors able to exert power on an international 
scale. International affairs occur at the speed of electrons, and the flow and density of information 
is increasing exponentially. All of these changes are outpacing the ability of U.S. national security 
processes hardened in the relative stability of the Cold War to adapt and keep pace.  
Democracies are inherently slow to adapt, but the failure to conceptualize a broader 
concept of conflict is part of why the United States is failing to adequately understand and respond 
to emerging threats by actors successfully synergizing a broad array of ways and means to achieve 
their goals below the threshold of war. Lacking understanding of the Gray Zone, faced with 
fundamental socio-political constraints to operating in it, and a general distaste for such nebulous 
forms of conflict, the United States is struggling to coalesce a concerted national strategy to 
respond, deter, or defeat such efforts by our adversaries. Unlike the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, which provoked a national crisis not seen since Pearl Harbor, the Gray Zone not only 
remains relatively unknown in the public psyche but tributary in national policy and attention. 9/11 
galvanized the nation to pursue a sweeping reorganization of government authorities and 
institutions, a global counter-terrorism campaign, and two regional wars that cost thousands of 
American lives and trillions of dollars. In contrast, actors in the Gray Zone seek to avoid inciting 
crisis, precluding the United States from galvanizing concerted attention and will to act.  
Technological Transformation 
The United States has dominated technological innovation for decades, but ultimate 
success is not who first develops the technology, but who realizes its strategic potential and 
employs it accordingly. The stirrup, gunpowder, tanks, airplanes, rockets, the Internet, social 
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media, and other disruptive technologies all have stories of those who created it and those who 
recognized is strategic value, often the two are not the same. In 1940, the French and British had 
superior numbers of tanks and airplanes yet were routed by an inferior German force that 
recognized the true strategic value of employing such emergent technologies in Blitzkrieg. Kodak, 
Yahoo, and MySpace are modern reminders of “The Innovator’s Dilemma,” popularized by 
Clayton Christensen, that the forerunner may be the first loser. In the case of new information 
technologies pioneered by the United States, the rest of the world still lags behind in their 
development, but in terms of strategically exploiting such disruptive technologies for adversarial 
competition some are already ahead of the United States.  
Not only have new information technologies begun to redefine power in global affairs, but 
they have lowered the bar for entry to those wishing to challenge the dominant powers. The history 
of great power competition highlights the primacy of economic and military might as the classic 
measures of power, but disruptive technologies properly harnessed can unhinge the scales. 
Undermining international institutions, sowing intra-state strife, or even altering sovereign borders 
did not necessarily require vast state-level resources or cutting-edge military technologies. At the 
center of Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, the Internet Research Agency 
was believed to have only spent $2.3 million and employed less than 200 staff and activists.27  
According to a 2018 U.S. Senate staff report, $45 can get you 1,000 social media bots with new, 
unverified accounts or $100 can get 500 unique, phone-verified accounts.28  Compared with $150 
million-per-copy for a fifth-generation fighter or $12.9 billion for a Ford-class nuclear-powered 
aircraft carrier, and one gets an appreciation for how information technologies can level the playing 
field for actors in the Gray Zone.29 
                                               
27 Max de Haldevang, “For Whom the Bell Trolls,” Quartz, October 17, 2017, https://qz.com/1104195/russian-
political-hacking-the-internet-research-agency-troll-farm-by-the-numbers/  
28 “Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security,” A 
Minority Staff Report for the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 115th Congress, January 
10, 2018, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf, 45  
29 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” 
Congressional Research Service, April 17, 2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS20643.pdf, 1.  
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Looking at the near-future, the rise of the cyber domain, the incipient ramifications of 
Artificial Intelligence, and corresponding notions of hyper-war open new revolutionary domains 
for competition and conflict that operate at a faster-than-human pace. Humanity will remain the 
principal variable in the calculus of statecraft and war for the foreseeable future, but AI-infused 
automation and big data analytics will create new challenges as the human reaction chain is 
exponentially shortened and the virtual distinction between man and machine continues to blur. 
Concurrently, the proliferating development of increasingly cheap, agile, and lethal drones, some 
that can be mass produced in a day, is threatening to undo faith in exquisite but exceedingly 
expensive weapon systems that take years to develop and field.30  Nation-states no longer possess 
a monopoly on technological innovation of military capabilities, society-level socio-economic 
information, or the capacity to instantly influence the mass public. Commercial technologies are 
outpacing government programs and the Internet-enabled global environment provides groups, 
and even individuals, with unprecedented access to people and information that are increasingly 
eroding the relative power of the state.  
The Limits of Great Power Competition 
Against the backdrop of this emerging future, the Westphalian state still retains powers and 
prerogatives that make it indispensable as the principal agent of international affairs. One such 
prerogative is nuclear weapons. In the post-1945 age of nuclear weapons, there has yet to be a 
direct, large-scale conventional war between nuclear powers. The danger of escalation makes the 
prospect of such a war implausible, although not impossible. There is a vast, ominous literature on 
nuclear war, deterrence, and the logic of avoiding escalatory conflict that will not be rehashed here, 
but it is important to reaffirm the centrality of nuclear weapons in limiting great power conflict. A 
principal assumption for the relevance of the Gray Zone is that nuclear-equipped great powers are 
therefore left to compete below the threshold of war. That does not preclude great powers from 
building immense conventional capabilities as another form of deterrence and as an instrument of 
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coercive power for dealing with non-nuclear powers, but it demonstrates the limits of the use of 
conventional militaries in the context of great power conflict. The Cold War exemplified this 
reality, despite the brinkmanship, that four decades of intense conflict never led to open war.  
Different Approaches to Great Power Competition  
The Cold War gave rise to the concerted formulation and development of new means and 
methods for great power competition below the threshold of war. George Kennan famously 
inaugurated the concept of Political Warfare in 1948 as “the employment of all the means at a 
nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”31  In the 1960s, Thomas 
Schelling extrapolated “conflict behavior” and strategies of gradual escalation below the threshold 
of war, writing that “the power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy – vicious 
diplomacy, but diplomacy.”32  For illiberal, non-democratic states like China and Russia rooted in 
realist thinking, these concepts continue to inform their approach to great power competition. 
Without the means to challenge or gain from other great powers by direct military means and 
seeing competition as a zero-sum game, they holistically embrace alternate means at their disposal 
to achieve their national interests.  
In contrast the United States and other Western democracies adopted a “Soft Power” 
approach of openness, engagement, and integration following the end of the Cold War. Soft Power, 
which “harnesses the allure of culture and values to enhance a country’s strength,” was pioneered 
by Joseph Nye, who also developed neoliberalism and notions of complex interdependence that 
greatly influenced the Clinton and Obama administrations.33  Coupled with the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, these liberal strategies initially reaped a dramatic change in global affairs, with some 
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heralding “the end of history.”34  However, after the brief honeymoon of the “Unipolar Moment,” 
great power competition has returned, fueled by a resurgent Russia, a rising China, and renascent 
nationalism that has surged to fill the ideological void left by Communism.35   The West has been 
slow to surrender the post-Cold War assumption that uninhibited integration with repressive 
regimes will inevitably assimilate them into the liberal international order without risk to 
democracies themselves.36  However, recent events not only challenge that assumption but portend 
its reversal as illiberal regimes are increasingly exerting influence on democracies. 
In response to Western successes with Soft Power and the corresponding lack of Soft 
Power appeal of their own repressive regimes, illiberal powers have sought to discredit and disrupt 
liberal democracies rather than proselytize. This has manifested itself in what Christopher Walker 
and Jessica Ludwig call “Sharp Power,” which “pierces, penetrates, or perforates the political and 
information environments in the targeted countries.”37  Sharp Power is enabled by the hyper-
connected environment the Information Revolution produced, which permits access and the ability 
to covertly influence a democratic populace on a massive scale in real time. Within an hour of the 
mass school shooting in Parkland, Florida on February 14, 2018, Russian-linked Twitter accounts 
produced hundreds of posts seeking to inflame public discourse on the divisive issue of gun 
control.38  The intent of such actions is not necessarily to promote one side over another as it is to 
polarize the public and further discredit democracy writ large. Much like the Gray Zone, Sharp 
Power is the emerging conceptual construct for understanding and characterizing how actors 
leverage power between the classic distinctions of Hard Power and Soft Power. 
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Chapter 3: Sino-Russo Commonalities 
The cast of actors operating in the Gray Zone is inherently difficult to discern and ever-
changing. All of the principal U.S. adversaries in what the Department of Defense calls the “4+1,” 
or China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and transnational Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), 
are exploiting the Gray Zone. Exploring all the adversarial actors operating in the Gray Zone is 
beyond the scope of this work. As is an exhaustive treatment of all the possible commonalities. 
Instead the focus will remain within the confines of great power competition with China and 
Russia, and their principal commonalities. While Iran is also a successful operator in the Gray 
Zone, and perhaps the most likely to spark a conventional conflict, China and Russia represent the 
greatest threats to U.S. national interests as codified in the 2017 National Security Strategy.  
China and Russia do not seek outright war with the United States but the erosion of U.S. 
hegemony and the gradual revision of the international order to suit their interests. During the years 
since 9/11, while the United States was fully engaged in the global counter-terrorism struggle and 
two-regional wars, China and Russia were studying the American way of conflict. In response they 
developed ways and means specifically tailored to challenge U.S. dominance and provide 
asymmetric advantages to exploit United States vulnerabilities.39  Our adversaries recognize the 
American proclivity for definitive conditions, “at peace” or “at war,” “with us” or “against us,” 
and have formulated strategies that exploit the gray areas between such dichotomies. It is clear that 
China and Russia do not characterize competition with the United States is such dichotomies.40 
Although often paired together, China and Russia represent very disparate entities with 
substantial incongruences in history, culture, and all manner of national composition and 
aspirations. They seek different goals for different reasons and possess distinct strengths and 
weaknesses. These distinctions are explored in greater detail in their respective profiles, but this 
section addresses the significant similarities that China and Russia share that enable their success 
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in the Gray Zone. U.S. strategies will need to uniquely address each country, but discerning certain 
commonalities helps to elucidate potential points of overlap and focus to inform our strategy and 
maximize limited national resources.  
First and foremost, both China and Russia are products of a prolonged Communist 
experience and presently subsist as authoritarian regimes run by dominating strongmen. As unitary 
agents, autocratic authoritarian regimes possess inherent advantages to act in the Gray Zone due 
to less political accountability, centralized decision-making, and less concern for international 
liberal rules and norms.41  By slight of political process Russian President Vladimir Putin continues 
to extend his near two decade reign, while Chinese President Xi Jinping has succeeded in 
consolidating power and removing constitutional term limits, already being heralded as “President 
for Life.”42  Both Putin and Xi have popularized a cult of personality, Putin in the form of the virile 
defender of conservative Russian values, while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has enshrined 
“Xi Jinping Thought” in the constitution as a pseudo-national ideology.43  Nevertheless, autocrats 
are only as secure as their network of elite loyalists and increasingly require external gains to 
appease their citizenry and distract from domestic grievances.44  Constructed to ensure the 
perpetuity of the autocrat, autocracies are fragile to shock and subject to groupthink and strategic 
stagnation, often lacking longevity beyond a successor. Although they offer advantages of 
unencumbered, unitary decision-making, autocratic regimes often appear stable and impervious, 
until they are not.45   
As a result of their Communist roots and repressive regimes, neither China nor Russia 
presently appear particularly attractive culturally or politically to the rest of the world. Both are 
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relatively homogenous nation-states that oppress minorities and dissent, and unlike the broad 
global appeal of American cultural wares ranging from McDonalds and Coca-Cola to Hip-hop and 
Hollywood, the appeal of Chinese and Russian culture is largely limited to their ethnic kin, 
peripheral nations, client states, and their respective diasporas. It is not for lack of effort on the 
part of either China or Russia in the realm of Soft Power. China has sought to evangelize the 
cultural and political merits of “the China model” around the world, most notably through the 
proliferation of Confucius Institutes that teach the Chinese language and the virtues of Chinese 
culture.46 Russia has also created numerous government-organized, non-government organizations 
(GONGO) to advance Russian interests abroad and extol the virtues of Russian language and 
culture under the nominal guise of NGOs.47  However, acknowledging their lack of broad political 
appeal, China and Russia have focused less on the merits of their authoritarian model, instead 
leveraging the openness of democratic systems to attack, divide, and undermine the relative 
attractiveness of democracy using Sharp Power in the Gray Zone.48   
In tandem with the lack of relative cultural and political appeal, both China and Russia 
suffer from a lack of alliances and partnerships. Russia possesses varying levels of influence 
amongst former Soviet republics and client states but maintains few formal security agreements. 
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), made up of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, is Russia’s feeble effort to counter NATO and consists 
largely of “reluctant allies.”49  Georgia and Azerbaijan actually withdrew from the CSTO, with the 
former now seeking NATO membership. Russia relies primarily on intimidation or enticement to 
garner joint participation in military exercises or permit forward-staging of Russian troops.50  
                                               
46 Gordon Watts, “Xi Jinping could end up being ‘President for life’ in China,” Asia Times, February 25, 2018, 
http://www.atimes.com/article/xi-jinping-end-chinas-president-
life/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ebb%2002.26.18&utm_term=Editorial%20-
%20Military%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief 
47 Minority Staff Report, “Putin’s Asymmetric Assault,” 47. 
48 Walker and Ludwig, “The Meaning of Sharp Power.” 
49 Janusz Bugajski, “Russia’s reluctant allies,” Center for European Policy Analysis, July 20, 2017,  
http://cepa.org/EuropesEdge/Russias-reluctant-allies  
50 Ibid.  
  20 
China is similarly bereft of codified allies, largely due to a political culture that is uncomfortable 
with security blocs and alliances.51  Despite a dearth of formal security partners, China’s influence 
continues to expand with its growing economic power and increased involvement in multi-lateral 
institutions. China nominally leverages North Korea to hedge against the U.S. presence in South 
Korea and in recent years the Chinese-Pakistani relationship has notably matured. However, like 
Russia, China is relatively isolated from a security alliance perspective, especially when compared 
to the elaborate global network of formal alliances and security partnerships the United States has 
constructed, which now includes over 62 nations.52 
Although the United States characterizes Chinese and Russian actions in the Gray Zone as 
pernicious and aggressive, China and Russia both portray the United States as the aggressor, 
seeking to impose Western values and regularly intervening militarily or imposing sanctions to 
compel other countries to acquiesce to its will. Putin and Xi both criticize the double standard of 
U.S. foreign policy, accusing the United States of violating sovereignty and running roughshod 
over international law in its many interventions.53  In addition to calling attention to the sorted 
history of U.S. interventions, China and Russia point to the hypocrisy of U.S. accusations against 
violating international rules and norms it has not ratified itself.54  China contends that while the 
United States is quick to cite the 2016 International Tribunal ruling against Chinese actions in the 
South China Sea under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the United States 
itself has not ratified the UNCLOS. Such cases provide fertile ground for claims of U.S. duplicity 
and undermine the power of international norms and rules. For its part, China simply dismissed 
the tribunal ruling.  
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Both China and Russia are nuclear-equipped powers with sufficient capabilities to maintain 
the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction through credible second-strike options, including 
ICBM, airborne, and at-sea capabilities. Russia maintains rough parity with the United States and 
possesses a more potent nuclear triad compared to the nascent but growing nuclear capabilities of 
China.55  Complementing their nuclear forces, both China and Russia have recently undertaken 
massive military modernization efforts, sought to professionalize their militaries, and developed 
advanced doctrines for waging irregular forms of warfare to counter Western conventional 
advantages.56  Both countries possess robust cyber capabilities and a willingness to use them. China 
and Russia also share a willingness to act contrary to international rules and norms and deny or 
litigate any accusations that they did so. In a final but important consideration for great power 
competition, both China and Russia possess permanent seats on the UN Security Council with veto 
power over UN security resolutions. 
Ultimately, China and Russia both seek to reclaim former glories, dominate their regions, 
remove foreign influence from their respective spheres, and modify the international order to suit 
their interests. Both Putin and Xi justify the actions of their regimes as restoring their rightful place 
in the world and defending against the encroachment of the West. China and Russia are both what 
Michael Mazarr calls measured revisionists, “states determined to change aspects of the current 
system without overturning it.”57  They recognize that they benefit from the international system 
but seek to modify it for their purposes accusing the Bretton Woods institutions and the present 
international system as favoring the West. Indeed, the most powerful international bodies were 
formed, headquartered, and are used to serve the interests of the United States and Europe.58   
Although the West dominates the international system and the global commons, China and Russia 
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both recognize that they have inherent advantages in their immediate periphery to achieve local 
dominance that can chip away at the global dominance of the West and progressive alter the liberal 
international order by changing the reality on the ground and perceptions abroad.  
All these shared attributes have led to concerns of a Sino-Russo alliance, especially in 
response to recent U.S. national security documents codifying both as threats, but their divergence 
in values and aspirations remains a significant impediment to realizing such an alliance. China and 
Russia are certainly mutually supportive, but not allies.59  Increased economic interdependence, 
cooperation on multinational institutions like the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
financial initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Bank, and extensive military cooperation and 
exchange have elevated Sino-Russo relations.60  China’s new defense minister, General Wei 
Fenghe, made his first foreign trip to Russia on April 3, 2018 where he boldly proclaimed, “let the 
Americans know about the close ties between the armed forces of China and Russia.”61  In 
response, some have characterized the Sino-Russo relationship as a “mutually beneficial 
partnership” that could be considered an “axis of convenience,” while others still portend the 
possibility of a “mighty axis,” but presently neither is seeking such an alliance.62  It is worth noting 
that the United States does risk promoting further Sino-Russo entente by posing a great enough 
threat to overcome their own mutual mistrust and competition.63 
Having highlighted some of the central commonalities shared by China and Russia, the 
next section will provide individual profiles of each outlining their unique capabilities and 
approaches to the Gray Zone. A greater understanding of how China and Russia exploit the Gray 
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Zone helps illuminate the threats they pose, why they pursue their respective strategies, and the 
overall importance of the Gray Zone in U.S. national security thinking and strategy. Although not 
an exhaustive analysis of either nation, these profiles draw upon the extensive knowledge and 
investigation of others to provide a general assessment of both. 
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Chapter 4: China - Profile 
The emergence of China into the center of the global economy and world politics is the 
most important international phenomenon of the twenty-first century.64       -Eliot Cohen 
China’s rise over the past four decades is remarkable, although it is still a bit early to know 
if China’s ascension will truly define the twenty-first century the way the twentieth century was 
defined by the United States. There is little doubt that China’s return to great power status is one 
the most important American foreign policy challenges of the new century.65  Realists like Graham 
Allison and John Mearsheimer have invoked the Thucydides Trap, warning that the passage of 
hegemony from one great power to another is not historically peaceful and that China and the 
United States are destined for war. For its part, China seeks to achieve global greatness without 
direct military conflict, perhaps embracing the Sun Tzu axiom “supreme excellence consists in 
breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”66  Steeped in the ancient tradition of Sun Tzu, 
Chinese strategic culture emphasizes the power of understanding and deception over American 
principles of mass, firepower, and maneuver.67  In short, the Gray Zone is ideally suited and natural 
to the Chinese approach to conflict. 
China is patiently gaining influence, subverting uncooperative neighbors, and gradually 
changing the reality on the ground in places like the South China Sea in a long-term strategy to 
supplant U.S. influence in the greater East Asian sphere and potentially challenge U.S. global 
hegemony. China is not seeking to tear down the stable, rule-based international order from which 
it has greatly profited, but to adapt it to accommodate China’s rising capabilities and aspirations 
for prominence. Deng Xiaoping, China’s most prominent leader since Mao Zedong, famously 
quipped that China should “bide its time and hide its capabilities.”68  Although such long-term 
focus and guile remains deeply embedded in Chinese strategic thinking, President Xi has more 
overtly asserted China’s aspiration to global greatness and Asian hegemony captured in his 
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“Chinese Dream” and “Great Rejuvenation” proclamations.69  Although Xi often connects these 
concepts to China’s imperial past, China does not seek the subjugation of its neighbors but to sit 
atop a hierarchical Asian system that commands their deference as well as the respect of the 
world.70 
China is playing the long, long-game in a methodical march to greatness that involves 
carefully weighing the most opportune times to act. Graham Allison contrasts American and 
Chinese strategic cultures as the difference between the United States playing checkers and China 
playing a 200-year game of Go, a notoriously complex, long-dwell game of strategy.71  China 
knows it has time on its side. Long-term prospects for continued high levels of economic and 
military growth means that each day China grows in relative strength compared to the United 
States and the rest of the world.72  Patience is strongly manifest in the Chinese strategic culture, 
codified in their doctrinal writing and evident in their actions in places like the South China Sea. 
The “imminent crisis” in the South China Sea has been transpiring in slow motion with provocative 
Chinese actions dating back to the 1990s.73  The pace only recently quickened as China has sought 
to consolidate its gains by building and militarizing islands in the contested waters.  
Although the U.S. military has only recently become infatuated with what it calls China’s 
“Anti-Access, Area Denial” strategy, the Chinese composed its strategy in the 1990s, and it has 
only taken this long for the development of technologies like the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile 
to catch up and capture American attention.74  It is China’s strategic patience and consistency that 
makes its Gray Zone strategies so effective. China is commonly labeled a “salami-slicer,” taking 
incremental actions that do not provoke war, but over time fundamentally change the region and 
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the strategic landscape.75  When China oversteps its bounds it may scale down its operations for a 
time or adapt its point of pressure, but it maintains a steady strategic trajectory toward its long-
term objectives.  
In an analysis of Gray Zone capabilities, China possesses a fairly strong report card. Its 
growing economic might and global investments provide it considerable leverage to influence 
other countries, it is rapidly advancing capabilities to counter U.S. advantages and undermine the 
U.S. presence in East Asia, and it is aggressively acquiring data to leapfrog innovation while 
bolstering its cyber and information warfare capabilities. However, China is not without 
weaknesses. China’s economic growth continues to slow with need to transition to a more 
privatized, consumer-based economy as well as address corruption, industry regulation, and 
growing income inequality. Xi’s abrogation of more liberal socio-political reforms and 
increasingly oppressive measures against dissension also risks provoking the more restive 
populations in China and estranging its growing middle- and upper-classes. His purges to 
consolidate power are stripping the Communist Party of China of capable administrators while 
eliminating diversity of thought in favor of unwavering loyalty. Finally, Chinese actions in the 
Gray Zone are increasingly generating blow back across East Asia and garnering the alarm of the 
United States, its regional allies, and even those originally receptive to increased Chinese 
involvement and investment.76 
Economic  
The engine behind China’s strength is its growing economic might. China’s meteoric 
economic rise began in 1979 and has sustained annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
averaging nearly 10% for the past four decades making China the world’s second largest economy 
and the largest manufacturer, merchandise trader, and holder of foreign exchanges reserves.77  In 
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the past decade China has become the largest trading partner with India, Africa, and the Middle 
East, as well as the second largest trading partner of the United States.78  Leveraging its growing 
economic influence through instruments like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian 
Investment Development Bank (AIIB), China is coopting dozens of countries into economic 
agreements that provide China with immense political power while excluding U.S. influence. The 
United States was not among the 57 nations that founded the AIIB, which is headquartered in 
Beijing.79  China’s mammoth BRI project thus far includes over 100 cooperation agreements with 
up to 86 countries and international organizations, with estimates as high as $8 trillion in total 
expected Chinese investment over the life of the project.80  The BRI is the principal instrument by 
which Xi seeks to cement a China-centric global economic order while still maintaining the 
thinnest veil of magnanimity and common prosperity.  
Building a global network of infrastructure investments not only advances China’s strength 
as the global trading mecca but provides it with substantial political leverage in a growing list of 
countries around the world. At face value, this is not ominous. The natural Soft Power influence 
that accompanies economic assistance is a trade-mark of U.S. foreign policy. However, China 
engages in what former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson calls “predatory economics,” which 
involve financing models that provide Beijing control of key foreign infrastructure when a country 
gets into financial trouble.81  In December 2017, Sri Lanka relinquished control of a strategic port 
in Hambantota to a Chinese state-owned company on a 99-year lease after falling behind on the 
$1.5 billion loan from Beijing to build it.82  Former President Mohamed Nasheed of the Maldives, 
warning that the Maldives national debt to China is unpayable and the loss of critical infrastructure 
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assets imminent, asserted, "without firing a single shot, China has grabbed more land than the East 
India Company at the height of the 19th century."83  Although overstated, China is not only directly 
acquiring strategic ports and other global infrastructure, but investing widely around the world, 
notably in place like Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America that receive less Western 
investment and attention.84  In many cases, China is offering large-scale investments in otherwise 
divested countries such as Venezuela, Pakistan, and Sudan, dictating financing terms that place 
countries eager for economic investment in compromising situations susceptible to Chinese 
coercion.  
Diplomatic  
Building off its growing economic influence around the world, China is bolstering its 
diplomatic clout in the broader international community. Since the dawn of the new century, China 
has been busy building multi-national institutions that exclude the United States. China established 
and headquarters the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an economic, political, and security 
cooperative that now includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, 
Pakistan, and an additional 10 observer states. China also successfully orchestrated inclusion in 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in what is known as the ASEAN+3 
cooperative, an expansion of the foremost multi-lateral institution in Southeast Asia. China’s 
pursuit of multilateralism to gain influence at the expense of the United States also expanded 
beyond Asia with the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the China-Arab States 
Cooperative Forum, and even the China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum.85  
U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Dan Coats testified to the Senate Intelligence 
Committee in March 2018 that in addition to its substantial economic investments, China will 
spend about $8 billion on foreign influence programs in 68 different nations to improve 
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“geostrategic positioning.”86  Collectively, these efforts led U.S. policy-makers to lament that 
China was “eating our diplomatic lunch” while the United States was consumed with wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.87 
Military  
Undergirding China’s rapidly growing economic and diplomatic influence as components 
of its Gray Zone strategy are its growing military capabilities and doctrinal emphasis on what has 
become known as the “Three Warfares” (san zhong zhanfa) in Chinese military writings. The 
Three Warfares are commonly equated with Psychological Warfare, Media Warfare, and Legal 
Warfare (Lawfare), and broadly fall under the concept of Political Warfare discussed earlier.88  
Highly deceptive, nuanced, and incrementally focused, the Three Warfares “seek to alter the 
strategic environment in a way that renders kinetic engagement irrational.”89  In essence, the 
center-piece of Chinese strategic military thinking is focused on the Gray Zone.  
To understand the Three Warfares, it is important to frame the political context of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rather 
than subservient to the state or the people. As an instrument of the party, the PLA’s dominant role 
is generating and shaping political power both internally and externally for the CCP.90  Within that 
context, the Three Warfares seek to sway or disrupt an opponent’s decision-making, influence 
long-term public opinion, and exploit the legal system to achieve political objectives both within 
China and abroad.91  Tangentially, the conjoined nature of the CCP and PLA not only provides a 
unified national strategy under central control, but a unique level of synergy and integration 
between the party, the military, and the many supporting functions of China’s state-controlled 
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society. The CCP permeates virtually every facet of life in China, providing an extraordinary 
capacity for mobilization. This affords China a distinct advantage in harmonizing not only a whole 
of government approach, but a whole of society effort in its Gray Zone activities.  
In the South China Sea, China employs the Three Warfares, leveraging lawfare to endlessly 
entangle and layer legal proceedings regarding territorial claims by others while employing China 
Maritime Surveillance (CMS) ‘white hulls’ to challenge foreign vessels and assert Chinese 
jurisdiction.92  By using the Coast Guard-like CMS, the Bureau of Maritime Fisheries, and even 
state-operated fishing trawlers, China is able to create a fait accompli with the United States. When 
U.S. Navy ‘gray hulls’ confront China’s ‘white hull’ vessels the Chinese portray such actions as 
aggressive and highly escalatory in both domestic and international media.93  Meanwhile the much 
larger and more numerous CMS vessels, many the size of naval cruisers, routinely menace smaller 
vessels from neighboring countries, often using water cannons and threatening bump tactics to 
drive them from the areas claimed by China.94  When the U.S. Navy conducts “freedom of 
navigation” operations in the South China Sea to reassert international law the Chinese portray the 
“hostile” U.S. military actions as provocative violations of its sovereignty justifying the 
militarization of its man-made islands as self-defense.95 
Information  
China regularly projects a sense of magnanimity in its dealing with others, portraying itself 
as a more benevolent, congenial alternative to the military adventurism of the United States. In a 
provocative yet revealing New York Times editorial by respected Chinese strategist Professor Yan 
Xuetong titled “How China Can Defeat America,” Yan writes, “China’s quest to enhance its world 
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leadership status and America’s effort to maintain its present position is a zero-sum game. It is the 
battle for people’s hearts and minds that will determine who eventually prevails. And, as China’s 
ancient philosophers predicted, the country that displays more humane authority will win.”96  
China’s emphasis on Soft Power, its peaceful record since the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979, its 
significant contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations, and its record of abstaining or voting 
against U.N. security resolutions that encroached on sovereignty issues are regularly contrasted 
against Western military interventions as it seeks to swoon populations around the world. 
At the heart of China’s Gray Zone activities are its influence operations. Rather than just 
another ancillary on a menu of options, influence operations are a core business for the CCP, which 
emphasizes the importance of controlling the narrative both domestically and internationally.97  
Domestically, Beijing has long-dominated the narrative through control of the media, the 
ubiquitous presence of the CCP, and increasingly Orwellian monitoring measures. Internationally, 
China is heavily subsidizing media broadcasting in places like Africa, crowding out commercial 
competitors by charging prices as low as $4 per month and offering free content for local 
newspapers from Xinhua, the Chinese state news agency.98  In a 2015 investigation, China Radio 
International (CRI) was found to be operating 33 stations in 14 countries including the United 
States, Australia, and Europe with content promoting Chinese interests.99  In what Joshua 
Kurlantzick terms a “charm offensive,” Chinese messaging is focused on distraction and 
manipulation, offering pro-China messages and programming that showcase a growing, advanced, 
and peaceful China.100 
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Complementing its media efforts, China manipulates the academic and policy communities 
in foreign states to be more conducive to China’s interests. Leveraging its large diaspora 
populations and state-sponsored institutions such as the Confucius Institutes, China infiltrates 
universities around the world under the ostensibly benign premise of cultural exchange and 
education. Investigations over recent years have revealed a concerted effort by China to limit 
academic freedom, control curriculum, and stifle criticism of Chinese policies and actions.101  A 
number of scandals have ensued. In response the American Association of University Professors 
produced a public statement in 2014 that admonished North American colleges to reconsider their 
partnerships with Confucius Institutes.102   
CCP manipulation extends to intimidation and coercion of Chinese nationals abroad, 
choking out independent Chinese-media outlets and compelling Chinese students and businessmen 
to act as agents of pro-Beijing influence.103  Using indirect methods, PLA intelligence-operated 
organizations such as the China Association for International Friendly Contacts and similarly 
innocuous front organizations sponsored by the well-resourced United Front Work Department of 
the CCP “seek to mobilize the party’s friends to strike at the party’s enemies.”104  This state-
sponsored front organizations co-opt local elites with privileged access and rewards to support the 
CCP or parrot its pro-China talking points.105 
Supporting its influence efforts are China’s formidable cyber capabilities, which it 
leverages to harass its adversaries, pirate intellectual property and trade secrets, and surveil and 
censor both its domestic population and Chinese dissidents abroad. China boasts the most Internet 
users globally, with over 384 million people online, and one of the premier cyber forces in the 
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world.106  In addition to employing specialized state-entities such as the PLA’s covert Unit 61398 
and various organizations in the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of Public Security, China 
boasts a hoard of de facto cyber militias commonly referred to as “patriotic hackers,” which operate 
loosely in support of the CCP while providing plausible deniability.107   
Although Chinese cyber-attacks against the United States abated after a 2015 agreement 
between Xi and Obama, recent reports indicate that China simply modulated this area of its Gray 
Zone tactics to adjust to the threshold of its target, and that Chinese cyber-attacks persist. A 2018 
U.S. Trade Representative report on Chinese cyber-espionage states “Beijing’s cyber espionage 
against U.S. companies persists and continues to evolve.”108  The report goes on to codify the 
Chinese cyber threat as “grave.”109  China cyber-espionage has not only caused billions of dollars 
in damages economically, but has stolen the technical data for dozens of major U.S. weapons 
systems as well as compromised the background investigation records of 21.5 million current and 
former U.S. government employees in the notorious 2015 breach of the Office of Personnel 
Management.110  China’s aggressive pursuit of growing volumes of data, its interest in becoming 
a global leader in emerging technologies like Artificial Intelligence and 5G wireless, and the 
proliferation of Chinese digital technologies that elicit Trojan Horse concerns exacerbate the 
demonstrated cyber threat that China already poses.  
Assessment 
China is rising, but in many ways, it has already arrived as a global power. Rapidly 
overtaking the United States as the most important economy in the world, China is increasingly 
asserting itself. Operating in the Gray Zone and translating its immense economic power into 
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global influence, Beijing is gradually supplanting the United States in a deliberate, long-view 
strategy to dislodge Western influence in East Asia. Eschewing direct confrontation with the 
United States and its East Asian allies, China is employing deception, economic dominance, and 
its Three Warfares to slowly erode U.S. power and influence in the region. It is not clear if China 
aspires to global hegemony, but there is little doubt that Xi seeks Asian dominance and greatness 
on the world stage. China’s Gray Zone success is undergirded by the Chinese proclivity for 
intrigue, strategic patience, and centralized cohesion and total mobilization under Xi and the CCP. 
Beijing is methodical in its calibration of Sharp Power, being far more subtle and shrewd than 
Russia. China’s rapid growth, professionalization, and modernization of its military coupled with 
its aggressive pursuit of innovative technologies promises that it will only grow more competitive 
in the years to come.  
Although China’s ascension is likely to continue, it is not inevitable. Beijing’s balancing 
act between economic liberalization and authoritarian control is getting more fraught as it faces 
growing tension from its burgeoning merchant class and the need to increasingly privatize to 
continue its economic growth. Demographic challenges from its one-child policy and an aging 
population also pose a drag on its economic growth. More specific to its activities in the Gray 
Zone, China is eliciting more negative responses from its neighbors as it ratchets up its aggression, 
prompting Brad Glosserman of the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) to contend, 
“It would be hard to construct a foreign policy better designed to undermine China’s long-term 
interests.”111  Indeed, many of China’s neighboring are bolstering their own military capabilities 
in response to China’s increased spending and aggression. Contrary to its designs for fracturing 
the U.S. East Asian alliance system, Chinese actions in the East and South China Seas are driving 
many to seek increased presence and involvement from the United States. Nevertheless, China’s 
slow-motion fait acompli in the South China Sea is all but complete, securing significant natural 
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resources and a strategic waterway, and its growing capabilities and aggressive actions in the Gray 
Zone present a substantial challenge. 
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Chapter 5:  Russia - Profile 
In Russia, nothing is more dangerous than the appearance of weakness.112 -Pyotr Stolypin 
Russia under Putin’s autocratic rule long-ago cast off the prospects of rapprochement with 
the West, embarking instead on a quest to realize Russia’s lost greatness by looking to the past and 
challenging the U.S.-led world order. Although less sophisticated and powerful than China, Russia 
makes up for both through audacious truculence. Willing to brazenly challenge international norms 
and rules, Putin has built domestic popularity upon his assertion of Russia’s rightful place as a 
great power and his willingness to act accordingly. Whether invading neighboring countries like 
Georgia and Ukraine, leveraging energy resources for economic coercion, or weaponizing 
information to undermine Western democracies and international institutions like NATO, Russia 
is increasingly impudent in how far it is willing to go in provoking a direct confrontation with the 
United States and its allies.  
Although Putin broadly vilifies the West, he is particularly scathing in his characterization 
of the United States as a dominating and encroaching threat, which he leverages to strengthen his 
base and undergird his provocative actions. Whether interfering in the 2016 presidential election, 
enflaming domestic tensions via social media, challenging the United States in the global 
commons, or even using proxies to attack U.S. forces in Syria, Russia is aggressively probing, 
challenging, and exploiting U.S. weaknesses and increasingly willing to directly test American 
resolve. Russia has employed a challenging mix of methods across the continuum of conflict while 
regularly denying culpability. This potent amalgamation of Russian actions in the Gray Zone poses 
a direct threat to the interests and national security of the United State and its allies. 
Russia is a complex adversary. According the Henry Kissinger, throughout its history 
“Russia has been a cause looking for opportunity,” caught in a perpetual paradox of “continuing 
ambivalence between messianic drive and a pervasive sense of insecurity.”113  Winston Churchill 
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famously said, “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, 
inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.”114  Putin 
conceptualizes Russian national interest in the failed Westernization of the 1990s, a revitalized 
nationalism, and a nostalgia for the glories of its superpower past.115  Gregory Feifer argues that 
Russia is perpetually stuck in 1999, subsisting off anti-Western sentiments that arose from the 
provocative NATO air war against Serbia and the rampant disillusionment of unmet expectations 
that accompanied Putin’s rise to power.116   
The 1990s was a period of unprecedented uncertainty and anxiety for Russians. Following 
the collapse of the Soviet system, the enshrouded structure of socio-economic stratification was 
destroyed, and inequalities were exposed and accentuated. The personal and international 
humiliation suffered by Russians during this period was indelible. Despite the eventual rise in the 
standard of living of most Russians, the catalytic shock of the economic and political collapse, 
followed by the lack of assistance from the West, left most Russians feeling vulnerable and 
abandoned. Putin’s bare-chested, horse-riding, tough-guy persona provided the salve for an 
emasculated population.117  Putin is fond of citing the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest 
catastrophe of the twentieth century and attributing the deprivation and fragmentation that 
followed as a scheme of the West to keep Russia weak.118  It is a narrative that Putin continues to 
propagate for his cause nearly two decades later, and it continues to find salience amongst 
Russians.  
Putin is an endogenous product of Russian society, which explains a great deal of his 
actions and his continued domestic popularity. Traumatized by Hitler’s invasion, the Stalinist 
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terror, the Soviet collapse, and the subsequent dominance of the West, Russians yearn for security 
and resonate with projecting strength despite weakness. Russia itself is fragile. Riven with internal 
socio-ethnic cleavages amongst the many displaced and disenfranchised minorities that suffered 
under the Soviet system, Russia is always at risk of further fracturing as a state. To hold Russia 
together not only requires deft manipulation and institutionalized patronage by Putin, but the need 
to project an external threat in the form of the United States. Grievances and conspiracies against 
the West proliferate in the Russian psyche. Putin exploits broad public sentiments that Russia 
repeatedly compromised to the West without reciprocation in such matters as German reunification 
and Russian economic liberalization. 
Despite the high societal costs of Putin’s authoritarian kleptocracy, Russians continue to 
resonate with his message and his aggressive foreign policy. This is due in part to state propaganda 
and the Kremlin’s control of domestic media that perpetuates the underlying image of the West as 
unreliable, devious, and degenerate, but it is also a product of the Russian penchant for a strong, 
masculine leader that lords his authority. Former Soviet Politburo member and Secretariat of the 
Communist Party, Alexander Yakovlev, explained that “It’s the leader-principle. It’s a disease, a 
Russian tradition… we live in fear of the boss.”119  Today, Russia is effectively a mafia-state with 
Putin as the patriarch who disposes people, property, and priorities the way a mob-boss does.120  
Fealty is paramount. Putin demands loyalty and in return provides peace, protection, and 
prosperity. Disloyalty is punished, as was the recent case with former Economic Minister Alexey 
Ulyukaev who was sentenced to eight years in prison for alleged bribery. 
Despite its bellicose rhetoric and antagonistic actions, Russian insecurity is endemic and 
its pervasive weakness is only offset by its stubborn resilience. Russian history is fraught with fear 
and incalculable loss to invading armies. Putin regularly cites the forward deployment of NATO 
troops near Russia’s borders and the recent U.S. National Security Strategy as proof of the 
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aggressive intentions of the West and the need to respond accordingly.121  Russia’s perpetual 
concerns about Western encirclement are accentuated by its relative weakness and isolation. 
Michael Kofman points out that “Russia is a perpetually weak great power… yet it is also 
eminently resilient.”122  Captured in Leo Tolstoy’s seminal work, War and Peace, Russian 
perseverance is a culturally defining trait. To be Russian is to be a survivor. It was a lesson hard-
learned by Napoleon in 1812 and Hitler during World War II. Yet many have written of the 
imminent decline of Russia due to a deteriorating economy and demographic challenges or foretell 
of the inability of the regime to survive after Putin.123  Such sentiments lead to underestimations 
of Russia, especially as a long-term challenger, as relatively weak as it may seem.  
Putin has honed his narrative and mastered the art of “whataboutism” to deflect Western 
attempts at direct attribution and normative accountability. Putin regularly attributes the rift in 
relations with the West to the breaking of a promise by the West not to expand NATO eastward 
after the dissolution of the Soviet system, although no such agreement was ever formalized, the 
narrative casts the West as the devious aggressor and Russia as the victim.124  In response to 
accusations of Russian meddling in the domestic politics of other countries, Putin points to the 
long, dark record of U.S. election meddling in various countries throughout the Cold War, and also 
contends that current forms of U.S. Soft Power, specifically promoting democracy in unfriendly 
authoritarian countries, is a form of interference in the domestic affairs of others.125  Against 
accusations of more overt actions such as Russia’s military intervention in Georgia and Ukraine, 
Putin claims he is following the precedent set by the U.S.-NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, 
which was not formally sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council.126  For Russians, who share 
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historic kinship with Serbia, the U.S.-NATO bombing campaign was seen as illegal and a 
humiliating affront to Russian prestige and even its national security.127  All of these inversions of 
perspective confound Western efforts to make a clear case against Russia, while providing a 
narrative that resonates with Russians. 
In an analysis of Gray Zone capabilities, Russia receives mixed reviews. While adept and 
aggressive, Russia is also reckless and relatively isolated, making it vulnerable to exposure and 
retribution. Putin himself is a source of strength, an adroit and opportunistic leader firmly 
established in an autocracy of his own making. He has also worked hard to cultivate a domestic 
image of indispensability. Putin’s mafia-style system of corruption transcends public and private 
boundaries enabling the Kremlin to side-step direct attribution as it outsources much of its Gray 
Zone activities to third parties, including paramilitary organizations like the Wagner Group and 
even criminal syndicates like Solntsevo and Tambovskaya that have ties to Russian security 
services.128  However, the same system of patronage, corruption, and authoritarianism make 
Putin’s regime vulnerable as an autocrat’s position is only as strong as his loyalist base.129  Putin 
remains popular for the stability and relative prosperity Russia has enjoyed but unless Russia 
changes course the future portends increasing international isolation and economic stagnation. 
Finally, Russian actions in the Gray Zone are accumulating more and more negative feedback from 
its periphery, the West, and the international community writ large. 
Economic  
The Russian economy has struggled to diversify and remains largely centered on 
hydrocarbon exports and mineral resources complemented by a large, sophisticated military arms 
industry and various high-tech public companies. The rapid liberalization of the Soviet command 
economy under Mikhail Gorbechev’s perestroika (restructuring) and Boris Yeltsin’s subsequent 
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presidency could not prevent an economic collapse, but Yeltsin’s patronage precipitated the 
consolidation of economic power in the hands of a few immensely wealthy oligarchs. Putin’s rise 
and his ensuing appointment of siloviki (loyalists from the security services) throughout the 
government and industry enabled him to eventually dispossess those oligarchs that failed to fall in 
line and cow others until his regime securely controlled the levers of power in the state, media, 
and economy.130  Creating his own system of patronage in a mafia-state, Putin uses corruption as 
a means to reward acolytes and punish dissidents. 
Corruption lubricates Russian methods both domestically and abroad. Internally, 
corruption is the means to ensure the perpetuity of Putin’s regime, but the Kremlin also exports 
corruption to target states by employing criminal sources and its cast of Russian oligarchs to 
finance everything from political contributions to outright bribery. A Global Financial Integrity 
report on illicit financial flows found that Russia averages over $100 billion annually.131  Much of 
the wealth is laundered through Western financial institutions and invested in luxury commodities 
and real estate in places like New York, Miami, and London, where it is used to gain access to 
Western political and business elites as well as fund Russian political influence operations.132  In 
2017, New York State banking regulators revealed that the German-based Deutsche Bank had 
helped Russian oligarchs launder $10 billion in unreported assets and shortly after the Organized 
Crime and Corruption Reporting Project unmasked a complex Russian money-laundering scheme 
that moved over $20 billion through Western banks.133  These vast sums of laundered money then 
fund various anti-establishment and fringe political movements to sow dissension and friction in 
the socio-political processes of the target countries. The challenge is tying the money back to the 
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Kremlin or proving that its purpose was deliberately destructive. In many cases political candidates 
that accept illicit Russian money are unwitting accomplices in Russian information campaigns. 
Complementing the export of corruption, Russia has spent over a decade perfecting its use 
of economic coercion, turning its vast hydrocarbon resources into a tool of political influence. 
Originally contrived as a means of rebuilding Russia’s post-Soviet economy, Putin’s quest to bind 
Europe to cheap Russian energy also projected goodwill while making Russia the “energy 
superpower” of Europe.134  Russia now accounts for an estimated 75 percent of gas imports to 
Central and Eastern European countries.135  Russia not only established patronage through its 
control of the vast energy infrastructure and supply, but has deliberately manipulated prices and 
supply to compel client states to acquiesce to the Kremlin’s political machinations. The Center for 
European Policy Analysis (CEPA) contends that Russia has operationalized economic coercion, 
purposely identifying economic vulnerabilities and planning actions for maximum effect, such as 
cutting off supplies in winter, as was the case with Ukraine in January 2006 and again in January 
2009.136  In recent years, the Kremlin’s ability to use economic coercion has declined as European 
countries have benefited from increasingly diversified energy infrastructure and a global surplus 
in natural gas production, but it remains a potent weapon in Russia’s Gray Zone arsenal.137   
Diplomatic  
The tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats and shuttering of consulates has many heralding the 
return of the Cold War. Russo-Western relations are undoubtedly at their worst since the Cold 
War, but Russia is leveraging its estrangement from the West to promote itself as an alternative to 
the U.S.-led liberal order. Moscow is making increasing inroads with pariah states such as Syria, 
Iran, and North Korea, cultivating closer relations with illiberal regimes like Turkey and China, 
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and more aggressively cultivating or coercing influence in its periphery. Diplomatically the 
Kremlin has little to lose given the galvanization of Western opinion against it. As such the Putin 
regime is incentivized to seek bedfellows with states acrimonious to the West and those 
disenfranchised or disadvantaged by the liberal international system. Capitalizing on such 
sentiments enables Russia to lead a broader opposition to the West and bolster its diplomatic 
obstructionism, while providing greater global legitimacy and support for its own interests. Having 
long dispensed with notions of cooperating where possible and competing where necessary, Putin 
seeks to deliberately undermine the West and alter the international order to favor Russia. 
As part of its revisionist Gray Zone strategy Moscow is increasingly inserting itself into 
international crises as a mediating agent to supplant the role dominated by the United States and 
its allies in the post-Cold War era. In recent years Russia has sought to mediate international 
disputes ranging from the pervasive Iran-Saudi conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and 
the long-standing dispute between the United States and North Korea. Russia’s dominant role in 
Syria began when it intervened diplomatically in 2013 to avert a U.S. military response to Syria’s 
use of chemical weapons. Moscow brokered a deal to dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons 
capabilities and ensure that Syrian compliance was enforced through the United Nations. The 
Kremlin has since reneged on that deal, playing the patron protector of Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad’s regime now that Russia is firmly embedded in Syria militarily and holding the cards 
diplomatically. To consummate its success, Russia has been working with Iran and Turkey to 
exclude the United States from the final settlement in Syria.  
After the failed liberalization of the 1990s and sufficiently rebuilding the potency of the 
Russian military, Putin returned to coercive diplomacy as a principal means to reassert Russian 
dominance over the “near-abroad.”  After a wave of Eastern European countries joined NATO in 
2004, Russia stepped up efforts and means to coerce peripheral states to remain within its sphere. 
Employing threats of military force through exercises and posturing, threatening economic 
reprisals and cutting off energy supplies, and engaging in disruptive cyber campaigns, the Kremlin 
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focuses on forcible means to compel peripheral states to bend to its will.138  Moscow is also actively 
directing anti-NATO, anti-EU groups in Ukraine, Georgia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Serbia, and 
Montenegro; all countries seeking membership in NATO, the EU, or both. In a more extreme effort 
to prevent Montenegro’s ascension to NATO in 2016, a plot linked to Russian intelligence services 
to assassinate Prime Minister Milo Đukanović and seize power was foiled, and Russia had to 
extricate its operatives from the region.139  Although, coup d’états are not its preferred method of 
compellence, it is indicative of Russia’s heavy-handed approach to diplomacy in its periphery. It 
is worth noting that Russia does employs Soft Power, such as providing six MiG-29 jets to Serbia 
as a “gift,” but in a broad sense the Putin regime is inclined toward bullying its neighbors rather 
than charm them.140   
Military  
Despite concerted efforts to modernize and professionalize its military, Russia remains a 
capable but unevenly yoked military power. Many of its most significant reforms where curtailed 
and modernization has been selective rather than broad, resulting in a mixed force of experienced 
professionalized units with modern equipment and conscript forces using Soviet relics. Military 
adventurism in the past decade, especially in Ukraine and Syria, has provided the Russian military 
valuable combat experience while demonstrating its growing operational competence compared 
to lackluster post-Soviet performances in the Baltic states (1990-1991), Transnistria (1990-1992), 
Chechenya and Dagestan (1994-2009), and Georgia (2008). Nevertheless, in contrast to the United 
States, Russian conventional military capability is inferior in almost every category. As a measure 
of resources, the Russian military budget is approximately 10% of the United States, but as 
discussed earlier information and cyber capabilities are extremely cost-effective, and Russia is 
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investing accordingly. Ensuring that Russia maintains control of the escalation ladder, it continues 
to advance its nuclear forces to ensure parity with the United States while leveraging a leaner but 
more potent military force heavily grounded in tools conducive to Gray Zone operations.  
In response to its diminished conventional capabilities Russia has relied much more on 
non-conventional means in what experts are calling Russian New Generation Warfare, Active 
Measures, Hybrid Warfare, or the Gerasimov Doctrine. The latter is named for the current Russian 
Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov. The Gerasimov Doctrine arose in Western policy 
circles as a result of public statements and writings by General Gerasimov observing the blurring 
of the line between war and peace, and advocating the use of subversion and political warfare to 
sow chaos and conflict within targeted states.141 Gerasimov’s 2013 article in the Russian Military-
Industrial Kurier describes how the ‘rules of war’ have changed and “the role of nonmilitary means 
of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the 
power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. … All this is supplemented by military means of 
a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of 
special operations forces.”142 Gerasimov also correlates a ratio of 4:1 in non-military means to 
military means in this new paradigm of conflict. Reflecting this emphasis on non-violent means, 
the Kremlin recently announced the creation of a potent new force within the Russian military 
focused on information warfare and propaganda.143   
The case of Russian involvement in Ukraine is particularly illustrative of what Gerasimov 
espouses, both in the emphasis on nonmilitary means and the concealed nature of military means. 
The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea was orchestrated by the Kremlin’s many agents of 
influence, but ultimately achieved by the infamous “little green men,” heavily armed Spetsnaz 
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forces with masked faces, wearing nondescript military uniforms without insignia or identifying 
information. The Kremlin denied direct involvement, exploiting the local and international 
confusion they had sown while masterfully manipulating the political crisis in Kiev to cover their 
subversive actions in Crimea. Less than a month after the conflict began Russia had secured the 
surrender of all 190 Ukrainian bases and some 25,000 Ukrainian troops in Crimea without firing 
a shot and produced a popular referendum purporting that 97% of Crimeans supported 
annexation.144 It was an impressive international fait accompli that validated the Gerasimov 
Doctrine. 
The Kremlin’s broader effort to return Ukraine to the Russia fold or create a Russian buffer 
region in the Donbas is a case study in Russian exploitation of the Gray Zone. The campaign 
involved a concerted effort across multiple domains employing diverse instruments that 
maximized ambiguity and information dominance. Internationally the Kremlin advocated for the 
plight of ethnic Russians resisting the repression of the “fascists” in Kiev while covertly supporting 
proxy groups with pro-Russian nationalist designs, including former members of the Chechen 
“Vostok” Battalion, the Chetnik Guards, various Cossack paramilitaries, and even the Night 
Wolves motorcycle club.145 Despite the success in Crimea, Russia faced greater difficultly in 
Eastern Ukraine for a variety of reasons related to demographics, geography, and Ukrainian 
resistance. Ultimately resorting to more conventional methods employing Russian mechanized 
forces, Russia still denied direct involvement. Even after Ukrainian government forces captured 
Russian soldiers, Russian acknowledged their presence but contended that they had crossed the 
border by accident.146 Although Russia’s Gray Zone campaign in Easter Ukraine ultimately 
required the employment of conventional forces in combat, Kremlin denials and the confusing mix 
of irregular forces enabled Russia to maintain some doubt to the degree of its complicity until after 
the conflict had abated. 
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Information  
Although Russia is not as anciently attuned to information warfare as China, it has been 
deeply engrained in Russia through the Soviet years and even back to the Tsar’s Okrhanka (Secret 
Police). Russia has revitalized the use of Soviet era Active Measures and the doctrine of 
spetzpropaganda (combat propaganda) using new digital technologies and the dynamic global 
environment to weaponize information and culture.147 Spetzpropaganda emphasizes a multi-
disciplinary approach employing “all aspects of politics, economics, social dynamics, military, 
intelligence, diplomacy, psychological operations, communications, education, and 
cyberwarfare.”148 Coupled with emphasis on maskirovka (deception) and the Soviet tradition of 
kompromat, which seeks to spread “compromising information” and blackmail prominent figures, 
Russia has made information warfare a fundamental pillar of how Russia approaches conflict in 
the Gray Zone.  
Russia leverages information broadly, utilizing diverse means to craft narratives that 
undermine the West while appealing domestically. Prominent Russian ideologue Alexandr Dugin 
conceptualized “NetWar,” which emphasizes a broad array of dissemination tools across the 
information domain to influence and shape perceptions in response to perceived Western efforts 
to do the same. The result is a spectrum of sources ranging from Russian media outlets like RT 
and Sputnik to social media trolls and Twitter bots. The U.S. State Department reports that the 
Kremlin spends an estimated $1.4 billion annually on disseminating its messages, which is nearly 
double what the United States spends on information operations through the Broadcasting Board 
of Governors (BBG) and recently established Global Engagement Center (GEC).149 International 
Russian media conglomerate RT (formerly Russia Today), whose motto is “Question More,” is 
well-established as the de facto mouthpiece of the Putin regime under the thin guise of an 
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“autonomous” media outlet.150 In a CEPA report on Information Warfare, Ben Nimmo contends 
that the true nature of contemporary Russian information operations is to provoke doubt, incite 
disagreement, and ultimately institute paralysis amongst adversaries.151 Nimmo characterizes 
Russian information tactics as serving four primary purposes: dismiss the critic, distort the facts, 
distract from the main issue, and dismay the audience.152 
Russian information warfare and propaganda are not meant to sow the seeds of political 
revolution or win the battle of ideologies as was the case in the Cold War, but to reap socio-political 
chaos that prevents productive political discourse from happening in Western democracies.153 
Chris Zappone calls it the “poison the well approach.”154 Christopher Paul, author of an influential 
RAND study of Russian information warfare, contends that Russians “want to tear down truth, 
trust, credibility, discourse, and democracy” through rampant proliferation of misinformation and 
disinformation.155 Paul characterizes Russian propaganda as “the firehouse of falsehood” 
consisting of high volumes of messages distributed from a dizzying array of outlets and mediums 
coupled with an brazen willingness to spread partial truths and outright falsehoods.156 Rapid, 
continuous, and repetitive in nature, Russian disinformation and misinformation operations 
achieve effects through sheer volume and pervasiveness.157 Paul is critical of Western efforts to 
counter Russian misinformation saying, “don’t expect to counter the firehouse of falsehood with 
the squirt gun of truth.”158 Undeterred by recent Western efforts to counter its information 
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campaigns, Russian efforts are growing in sophistication and prevalence in Europe, the United 
States, and extended to new venues like Mexico.159 
Assessment 
The decline of Russia is greatly exaggerated. Labeling Russia a great power in decline 
obscures more than it illuminates. Compared to a resolute Soviet Union in 1978 contemporary 
Russia is weaker, but compared to 1998, Russia is resurgent and capable. Over the past decade, 
the Kremlin has employed a formidable range of instruments of aggression within the Gray Zone 
that include infiltration, subversion, cyber-attacks, information warfare, economic coercion, and 
hybrid warfare involving special forces, mercenaries, and criminals.160 Although not all of the 
Kremlin’s Gray Zone strategies were as fruitful as in Crimea, Russia is still succeeding in 
redrawing international boundaries and cowing states around its periphery without great cost. 
Efforts to disrupt adversaries abroad have also yielded fruit, contributing to the inability of the 
United States and NATO to rapidly respond to Russian aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere. 
Russia’s increasingly sophisticated information warfare methods and its blatant willingness to 
manipulate the internal socio-political workings of other states remains an unmitigated challenge. 
The Kremlin’s actions within the Gray Zone are not wholly without costs. In fact, the less 
subtle nature of Russian activities undermined many of the very objectives it sought to achieve. 
Rather than returning Ukraine to its sphere, Russia further alienated the majority of Ukrainians, 
who are now more securely in the Western camp. Instead of weakening NATO, which had become 
anemic and in search of a cause post-Cold War, it has been revitalized against Russia. And Russian 
antagonism has galvanized the West around punishing sanctions that target the elites upon whom 
Putin relies for power. Much credit is given to the shrewdness of Russian operations in the Gray 
Zone, but for all its success the Kremlin enjoyed a first-mover advantage and conducive 
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circumstances, and future endeavors will face greater resistance and insulation as its targets are 
more alert and better prepared for its wiles.161 Nevertheless, while the Baltic states, NATO, and 
the United States are now relatively inoculated, states like Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova remain 
vulnerable, and Russia is actively probing the Balkans.162 Although Russia may have overplayed 
its hand in the Gray Zone, reducing initial advantages it enjoyed, Russia remains a potent threat to 
its weaker neighbors and continues to pose a challenge to even the most stable democracies.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Russia is currently the more dangerous and active threat, but a rising and increasingly 
assertive China poses a greater challenge long-term. Although historically resilient, Russia’s 
demographic challenges, eviscerated institutions, increasing international isolation, and dwindling 
economic potential portend a decline, while China is steady, strategic, and increasingly closing the 
gap in economic and military power with the United States as it gradually asserts a broader foreign 
policy. Nuclear deterrence precludes the likelihood of large-scale conventional war amongst 
nuclear great powers making the Gray Zone a principal means for competition. Both Russia and 
China have demonstrated their understanding of the Gray Zone, have institutionalized Gray Zone 
methods, and are successfully developing and employing Gray Zone strategies that exploit 
weaknesses in the U.S.-led world order to modify it for their own purposes at the expense of the 
United States. 
These cursory profiles of China and Russia provide only a glimpse into the broader 
transformation taking place in the character of conflict and the strategic landscape. Although some 
are heralding the resumption of the Cold War, it was a construct unique to the direct competition 
of two ideologically-opposed superpowers vying for global dominance in the social, political, and 
technological context of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Although there are parallels, the 
emerging strategic reality requires a new conceptual construct to frame the unique challenges 
possessed by great power competition in the twenty-first century. Disruptive technologies 
accompanying the Information Revolution, unprecedented global socio-economic 
interdependence, and the increasingly chaotic multi-polar world demand a new understanding, not 
a recycled construct whose time has passed. The Gray Zone concept does not presuppose itself to 
the globally defining role that the Cold War concept achieved, but the Gray Zone does provide a 
useful construct to understand the new colors of Clausewitz’s chameleon-like character of conflict 
as it presents itself today, and for the foreseeable future.  
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More of the Same is Not the Answer 
The patriarchs of strategy warn of suffering for a lack of understanding and caution against 
the fatal error of wishing the character of conflict to be something it is not. Looking at the past 
seven decades since the last World War, former commander of U.S. Special Operations, Admiral 
(ret.) Eric Olsen, observes that war for the United States has not been large-scale state-on-state 
combat, but instead dominated by the “submilitary violence” that has become a hallmark of the 
Gray Zone. Olsen is critical of America’s outdated, oversimplified strategic approach that focuses 
on conflict as we wish it to be rather than adapt to “the complexities of a chaotic, cyber-empowered 
and highly globalized world.”163 Even more damning, Michael Kofman contends that “the 
Pentagon remains wholly committed to the fantasy of having conventional wars with nuclear 
states, where they will let us win, accepting defeat without a nuclear exchange.”164 We must 
certainly be prepared for conventional and nuclear war, but a key lesson of the Cold War is that 
“indirect” methods ultimately determine outcomes, and the United States is ill-prepared for the 
new generation of indirect methods being employed in the Gray Zone that undermine alliances, 
international norms, and the foundations of democratic discourse.165   
Adapt or Die 
The past three decades of uncontested global dominance constituted a good run, but the 
world has changed, adversaries have advanced to exploit the weaknesses of the champion, and if 
the United States fails to adapt to the changing rules of the game it risks losing more than its title. 
The 2018 National Defense Strategy extols the need “out-think, out-maneuver, out-partner, and 
out-innovate” challengers, but if the fundamental strategic understanding is flawed, how can 
America expect to achieve the former?166 Adaptation can only come from conceptual coherence 
about the problem that must be solved, which itself is derived from a deep contextual 
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understanding of the problem and its environment.167 Since the end of the Cold War, the United 
States has expended immense intellectual and economic capital on an unimaginative “the same, 
but better” approach to strategy that has not only failed to keep pace with the changing character 
of conflict, but produced a costly graveyard of failed military innovations and strategic gaffes.168 
Put simply, the winning strategy is no longer winning, and it is time to not only readdress our 
national strategy but our strategic understanding. The recent National Security Strategy and 
subsequent National Defense Strategy were a step in the right direction, but more must be done to 
understand great power competition as it manifests itself in the Gray Zone and translate that 
understanding into policy. 
What Must Be Done 
To offer explicit policy prescriptions to address Gray Zone challenges requires an in-depth 
analysis of great power competitors juxtaposed against the strengths and weaknesses of the United 
States and grounded in a deep contextual understanding of the strategic environment. Such analysis 
exceeds the scope of this paper but is urgently needed to engender a complete and coherent 
understanding from which to properly develop a sustainable strategy to address Gray Zone threats. 
The current NSS and NDS signify a reengagement with the world beyond counter-terrorism, but 
as strategic documents they lack definitive purpose and concrete policy decisions related to the 
Gray Zone. There remains need to objectify their broad national security goals with tangible 
strategic parameters and directives that connect ways, means, and ends. Adversaries like China 
and Russia are employing concerted strategies in the Gray Zone harnessing a wide array of national 
elements of power that require a commensurate response. Failing to understand and address the 
Gray Zone will enable adversaries to continue the gradual attrition of U.S. power and influence. 
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There are genuine efforts by the public and private sectors of American society to address 
threats in the Gray Zone in specific areas, but few concerted efforts to address the Gray Zone 
holistically. The enormity of the issue, which spans all domains and crosses multiple disciplines, 
poses a significant impediment to the type of study and action that is needed. Congressional sub-
committee hearings and reports on specific activities or adversaries by a host of think tanks, 
academics, and government agencies help build the literature and selective understanding of the 
Gray Zone, but like the proverbial group of blind men who attempt to collectively identify the 
elephant by each touching only a part of it, these efforts fail to capture to scope and pervasiveness 
of the problem. The catastrophe of September 11, 2001 precipitated a concerted effort to fully 
address the threat of terrorism manifested in the 9/11 Commission, whose report had far-reaching 
ramifications for the United States. The Gray Zone demands a similar effort. Although the Gray 
Zone precludes a galvanizing 9/11-type national crisis, which itself is a conundrum, it is incumbent 
that elected officials recognize the gravity and scale of Gray Zone threats. The most urgent need 
is to commission a Blue-Ribbon panel with appropriate scope and resources to provide a full 
accounting of the danger to the American public along with informed policy prescriptions to 
address it. 
General Recommendations 
By its nature, the defining feature of the Gray Zone is ambiguity. In response, emphasis 
much necessarily focus on exposing and elucidating the actors, actions, and legal standing of 
activities in the Gray Zone. The Justice Department investigation into Russian interference in the 
2016 presidential election led by Special Counsel Robert Mueller is just one example of a national 
effort that provides the legal rigor and relatively apolitical credentials to expose an aspect of Gray 
Zone actions, but much more must be done. Just as adversaries act across a spectrum of vectors 
and means in the Gray Zone, efforts to expose them must be equally diverse and prolific. Animated 
and coalesced by U.S. government initiatives, the media, civil society, academia, and private 
enterprise can be harnessed to proliferate information that expose Gray Zone methods, helping to 
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inoculate the United States against many of the malign actions that are undermining U.S. power 
and influence.169 
Although the openness of democratic society provides access and vulnerabilities for 
adversaries to exploit, American values and liberal governance are a source of strength both in the 
realm of Soft Power and in buttressing U.S. legitimacy in the international economic and political 
order. It would be a mistake to compromise our values by mimicking many of the insidious Gray 
Zone methods being employed by our illiberal adversaries. The post-9/11 foray into interrogation 
techniques serves as a cautionary tale of the lasting costs to U.S. legitimacy and strategic power 
from compromising our values for operational gain. To retain the significant advantages of Soft 
Power and sustain the trust that undergirds our place in the international system we must remain 
resolute in our values. Reiterating Joseph Nye’s admonishment, we must leverage our Soft Power 
to continue “to build a world congenial to our basic values in preparation for a time in the future 
when we may be less influential.”170 
As important as not compromising our values is how we express them in a hyper-connected 
world awash in information and competing narratives. Modern populations are increasingly 
overstimulated by signals and cues from a myriad of sources offering conflicting “truths.”  It is 
imperative to convey our values clearly, consistently, and with verifiable veracity in both word 
and deed. We must recognize that our values are not all universal, and exhibit respect for other 
cultures and norms. Championing self-determination, we must not force dichotomous choices on 
others – to choose between “us or them.”  We may not like the choices some make, but we must 
practice what we preach. In Asia, the United States can expect to continue to diminish as China 
continues to rise, the issue is how our relationship with China and the rest of Asia evolves, which 
is based in large part on our own behavior. 
Coalition-building and interagency integration are essential to succeeding against Gray 
Zone challenges. Adversaries in the Gray Zone are already demonstrating comprehensive whole-
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of-government approaches that require a commensurate approach. Building broad coalitions are 
also invaluable. Not only do partners offer unique expertise, perspective, and insight into the 
complex problems presented by Gray Zone threats, but they bolster legitimacy and can have a 
profound effect on narratives and global perceptions. Leaders across the U.S. national security 
enterprise must continue to cultivate a strategic culture that embraces a “Joint, Interagency, 
Intergovernmental, Multi-lateral” (JIIM) mentality and promotes a “by, with, and through” 
partners approach. 
Paramount is the need for the United States to understand the Gray Zone and adapt our 
strategic culture to see the new form of great power conflict for what it is. We must shed our insular 
attachments to past success and parochial preferences for competition on our terms and acclimate 
ourselves to the new strategic environment while considering the full spectrum of conflict. Our 
adversaries are increasingly discussing and employing non-military means to determine strategic 
outcomes before the onset of conventional combat – “winning without fighting.”171 If we continue 
to approach great power conflict focusing on military dominance we may find that we yield a really 
big hammer when a full tool kit is necessary to hold together the proverbial house we built. And 
finally, the Gray Zone is an endurance sport, we must think and act accordingly.  
Warning 
We ignore the Gray Zone at our own peril. In the twenty-first century rendition of great 
power competition, China and Russia are excelling at low-risk, high-payoff actions below the 
threshold of war to achieve their incremental strategic objectives. The effects are cumulative and 
appear lasting. The fatal conceit is believing that Gray Zone threats are ancillary. For our 
adversaries, the Gray Zone represents the dominant means to realize their revisionist interests and 
challenge the U.S.-led world order. If we fail to understand the nature of the threats, lack the 
humility to acknowledge the danger, or are bereft of the courage to depart from what we know 
then we risk more than just the fraying of U.S. power and influence.  
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